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Abstract. In Requirements Engineering, requirements elicitation aims
the acquisition of information from the stakeholders of a system-to-be.
An important task during elicitation is to identify and render explicit the
stakeholders’ implicit assumptions about the system-to-be and its envi-
ronment. Purpose of doing so is to identify omissions in, and conflicts
between requirements. This paper offers a conceptual framework for the
identification and documentation of default requirements that stakehold-
ers may be using. The framework is relevant for practice, as it forms a
check-list for types of questions to use during elicitation. An empirical
validation is described, and guidelines for elicitation are drawn.
Keywords: elicitation; default logic; default requirements; context; decision-
making
1 Introduction
Requirements elicitation is one of the first steps of Requirements Engineering
(RE), the main purpose of which is to produce a specification of the system-
to-be, which satisfies some requirements, and which is sufficiently clear, precise,
and complete to be used in subsequent systems engineering steps. Hereafter,
we will refer to requirements elicitation only by elicitation. Elicitation focusses
on the acquisition of information from the stakeholders of the system-to-be as a
source of requirements that the system-to-be should satisfy. Such process involves
communication with the stakeholders. Although communication is not the only
means to elicit information relevant for RE, we will focus only on it in this paper.
One important issue during elicitation is that information provided by stake-
holders can be uncertain and incomplete. Uncertain, because it reflects their
beliefs and desires about the future. Incomplete, because they cannot anticipate
all conditions that may arise in the future, when the system-to-be is operational.
Our concern in this paper is completeness, while we will not be discussing un-
certainty. Regardless of how uncertain information from the stakeholders is, our
aim is to look for how to reduce its incompleteness. In particular, our concern in
this paper is how to acquire and document information that is implicitly assumed
by stakeholders during elicitation.
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Our starting point is the idea that implicit assumptions that stakeholders
make can be understood as a non-monotonic reasoning (NMR). Many influen-
tial theoretical frameworks have been proposed to model such reasoning [1,2,3,4],
but we concentrate in this paper on Reiter’s default logic, and use it as a con-
ceptualization through which to study implicit assumptions stakeholders may be
making during elicitation. We consider that such assumptions are defaults, the
normality assumptions that stakeholders consider given, and from which they
derive information which they then explicitly communicate. We see defaults as
potential source of additional requirements, that we called default requirements.
Our contribution can be summarized in the following points: (i) the review
of related work in RE, context and NMR literature, (ii) the presentation of how
default logic can be used in RE as a support for the identification of implicit
information,(iii) the definition of a context framework to be used as a check-
list for documentation during elicitation and (iv) the empirical validation of the
framework.
This paper structures as follows. We present a review of related work (§2), de-
scribe the theory of default logic and its application in RE (§3). We then present
a survey of context’s definitions and define a framework for the documentation
of default requirements (§4). We describe the way our empirical validation of the
framework was handled (§5), present and discuss the results of the experiment
(§6,7) and provide a final conclusion about our contribution (§8).
2 Related Work
In their seminal paper on the four dark corners of RE, Zave and Jackson es-
tablished a core ontology for RE, which describes the important concepts to
be accounted for in RE [5]. Doing so, they suggest that information about do-
main assumptions, requirements and specifications of the system-to-be must be
collected, documented and analysed in order for RE to be successful. Jureta et
al. broaden this ontology by suggesting that any communicated information is
relevant to consider as part of requirements problem [6]. In other words, any in-
formation that is explicitely adressed to the engineer is relevant to consider . The
present paper argues that both explicit and implicit information are relevant to
consider.
One common way to identify requirements is the goal-oriented approach, in
which engineers should understand the why of a system before defining the what
[7]. Engineers should therefore try to capture intentions of stakeholders for the
system-to-be. Various methods exist to capture such information [8], some of
which focus on the decision-making process of stakeholders [9]. In this paper, we
complement such contribution using the more formal default logic theory.
Some attention has been paid to test empirically the factors that influence
default reasoning. Ford and Billington [10] for instance propose an experiment to
validate the impact of such subjects-related factors on default reasoning. They
present factors such as the reluctance to draw conclusion based on conflicting
rules or the number of positive and negative sentences, which they argue influence
the consistence of reasoners. Elio and Pelletier [11] propose that default reasoning
is likely to be influenced by several external factors. They highlight that whether
an objects is naturally-occurring or artificial influences the way people think
about this object. They also discuss the influence of other factors like the quantity
of information that is provided or the information about the relative size of the
objects.
To the best of our knowledge, no experiment has been performed in RE to
study the use of default reasoning and context during elicitation. Some of our
research efforts went on the validation of previous NMR factor in RE [12], and
on the definition of a more complete list of context factors to be accounted for
during elicitation [13]. The present paper comes as the conclusion to these initial
experiments.
There has been limited attention regarding the question of accurate context’s
definition in RE. Yet, context as a source of information is not new. Many papers
propose high level discussions about context in RE: Potts and Hsi [14] empha-
size the existence of Contextualism – opposed to abstractionism – as a possible
alternative design philosophy for information systems. Viller and Sommerville
[15] propose discussions about how ethnographic analysis is value-added to RE,
thereby broadening the scope of RE context to culture questions. Beyer and
Holtzblatt propose the Contextual Design model [16], which increases the scope
of relevant information to any data about the field where people are living. Pre-
vious works illustrate the trend to include even more data in the scope of RE
relevant information. Cohene and Easterbrook [17] discuss a topic closer to what
we address in this paper. They suggest that elicitation techniques that are used
in an interview should be adapted to fit the kind of information engineers are
trying to find, i.e. adapt the elicitation technique to the situation – or context.
While previous works highlight how valuable information about context is to
RE, we find only few papers proposing a structured definition of context that is
adapted to RE. One of them is a paper of Sutcliffe et al. [18], which goes on a
method for requirements analysis that aims to accounts for individual, personal
goals and the effect of time and context on requirements. They suggest a list
of aspects to deal with, but do – to the best of our knowledge – no empirical
validation. RE community seems to agree on the importance of further research
on the link between context and RE. Cheng and Atlee [19] stress the importance
of context and empirical validation of RE models as a direction for future research
to accelerate the transfer of research results into RE practice.
3 Default Requirements
In this section, we introduce a running example, describe what is default logic
and how it is used to identify implicit information used during requirements
elicitation.
3.1 Running Example: LogisTIC
LogisTIC is an SME specializing in the distribution of fragile non perishable
products (e.g. dishes, decoration, windows, etc.). LogisTIC employs forty people,
organized across five departments. One of them concentrates on the management
of risk and is responsible, among other, for deciding what transportation com-
pany (TC) is the most trustful. For instance, it recently decided to use Trains &
Co rather than Planes&Co because rate of broken parts was significantly larger
with the latter. To support the risk management activity, the chief executive
officer (CEO) of the firm wishes to accelerate the choice of TCs using a decision-
support system (DSS), so that the risk department can focus on other relevant
risk aspects. The CEO claims that one of the most critical aspect in this project
is to identify what variables must be accounted for in the risk estimation of a
TC in order to simulate correctly the decision-making result of a risk employee.
A requirements engineer is hired to elicit these variables and specify a system
that decides which TC to choose.
3.2 What is Default Logic
NMR theories offer various ways to study decision-making of LogisTIC’s risk
employees. We consider Reiter’s default logic [3] is particularly relevant for this
paper, since it builds on concepts that correspond to important aspects of elic-
itation. Our contribution could however be easily adapted to fit other NMR
formalisms such as [4,1,2]. The purpose of Reiter’s default logic is to formalize
inference rules without explicitly mentioning all their exceptions, i.e. formalize
inferences by default of contradictory information. In default logic, the normality
assumption of a stakeholder states that, in absence of evidence to the contrary,
default assumptions hold. We assume this is what a stakeholder does whenever
she has to decide about a requirement facing a context she does not perfectly
know: she uses a default theory.
A default theory is a pair 〈D,W 〉, in which D is a set of default rules
{D1, ..., Dn}, and W is a background knowledge. W consists of first order logic
(FOL) premises summarizing what the decision-maker knows “for sure”. D is a
set of expressions such as the one reported in Eq. 1 that summarizes what the
decision-maker believes. Eq. 1 reads that if X is a bird, and if it is consistent to
assume that X can fly – M being an operator to evaluate the consistency of the
subsequent proposition Fly(X) against the background knowledge W –, then it
is believed that X can actually fly. Next sub-section discusses how the previous
default theory can be used as a way to model decision-making during elicitation
of requirements.
Di =
{
Flies(X) : M Fly(X)
Fly(X)
}
(1)
3.3 Default Logic in Requirements Engineering
Back to our running example, we want to support the engineer in determining
what aspects are considered by a risk employee when she decides about which
TC to choose. We use the default logic to formally document such reasoning.
We denote with T the theory that is used by the employee. T consists of
a pair 〈D,W 〉, and the engineer might be interested in documenting these el-
ements in order to capture requirements and hence specify the DSS. Consider
for instance that LogisTIC’s employee usually uses punctuality as a variable in
her decision. This can be documented as an assertion isOnTime(X) – where X
is a TC. Previous assertion can be interpreted by the engineer as the necessity
for a TC to be usually on time in order to be selected by LogisTIC’s DSS, i.e.
as a requirement for the DSS. When she has to decide which TC to choose,
the stakeholder reasons about isOnTime(X) using a background knowledge W .
Assume that she knows the company Trucks&Co usually suffers from frequent
delays, that the company Trains&Co is usually on time, and that Planes&Co
and Trains&Co have their own vehicles, which is not the case for Trucks&Co
which shares its vehicles with another company. The previous knowledge back-
ground is formalized in Eq. 2.
W =
{
ownV hcl(Planes&Co), ownV hcl(Trains&Co), ¬ownV hcl(Trucks&Co),
¬isOnTime(Trucks&Co), ¬isOnTime(Trains&Co)
}
(2)
Now, the stakeholder has likely not a perfect knowledge background about
the transportation context. There are probably pieces of information that she
does not know, which are required for her to make a decision about which TC to
choose. For instance, Eq. 2 tells us that the stakeholder does not know whether
Planes&Co is usually on time. Because this information is still necessary to
solve isOnTime(Planes&Co), the stakeholder may fill in this gap by assuming
that TCs having vehicles of their own are usually on time, unless such assertion
is not consistent with what she knows. In other words, the stakeholder can use
W in combination with a set of default rules D, and can thereby build a default
theory T . The assertion isOnTime(Planes&Co) consequently suggests the use
of a default rule such as reported in Eq. 3.
D =
{
ownV hcl(Planes&Co) : M isOnTime(Planes&Co)
isOnTime(Planes&Co)
}
(3)
D reads as follows: if Planes&Co has its own vehicles, and if it is consis-
tent to believe that Planes&Co is usually on time, then it can be believed that
Planes&Co is usually on time. The member ownV hcl(Planes&Co) is a pre-
requisite to the default: it is necessary but not sufficient for the default to hold.
The member : MisOnTime(Planes&Co) is the consistency test that must
also be verified for the rule to hold. As a reminder, isOnTime(Planes&Co) is
consistent with W if ¬isOnTime(Planes&Co) does not follow from W based
on deductive inferences. The denominator member isOnTime(Planes&Co) is
the result of a default rule, and is a belief of the stakeholder.
The way we see previous situation is that a default theory suggests larger
requirements than what is communicated by a stakeholder. For LogisTIC, the
employee reasons about the initial assertion isOnTime(X) using an incomplete
W . Doing so, she defines a new default rule, the belief of which being her ini-
tial assertion, e.g. based on Eq. 3, she decides it is reasonable to believe that
Planes&Co is usually on time because it has vehicles of its own. Using such rule,
the stakeholder suggests that it is important for the DSS to account in some way
for the fact that a TC has its own vehicles. In the case such default rule is not
documented, the engineer would work with a single requirement isOnTime(X)
and specify a system that does not behave exactly as the risk employee reasons.
We interpret the previous as the existence of a default requirement.
3.4 What are Ground and Default Requirements
A stakeholder may communicate an assertion for which she has a perfect knowl-
edge. In such case, reasoning about that assertion does not imply to use a default
theory. Ground requirement refers to such assertion, for which it is not nec-
essary to use a default rule in order to reason about. A ground requirement is
an assertion on which the stakeholder can decide strictly based on W . It takes
the form of Eq. 4.
ground requirement = assertion(X) (4)
We call default requirement any default rule that is used when the stake-
holder has imperfect knowledge background to reason about the assertion. Us-
ing a default requirement, the stakeholder communicates a belief – previously
referred to as assertion and assumes some underlying ground requirements –
previously referred to as prerequisites. We adopt the view that a belief is a re-
quirement for the system when it is communicated by means of directive speech
acts [6]. Both belief and ground requirements form source of information about
expectations of the stakeholder toward the system-to-be. The requirement is said
to be “by default” because it describes an assertion that is believed as long as its
ground requirements are verified. A default requirement takes the form of Eq.
5. X is called an object, and can be seen as the entity targeted by the default
requirement.
default requirement(X) =
{
ground requirements(X) : consistency test(X)
belief(X)
}
(5)
Based on equation 5, an engineer knows that any belief communicated via di-
rective speech act is not complete enough to be reported as a single requirement.
To improve completeness of the elicitation, engineers might want to identify the
complete default rule that has been used by the stakeholder in order to decide
about the communicated belief: hence, the engineer could identify underlying
ground requirements. We believe the previous supports engineers in that the use
of a default rule by a stakeholder may not always be explicitly communicated,
thereby preventing the engineer from identifying the underlying ground require-
ments of a belief. We see many reasons for this, the most significant ones being
that:
– stakeholders may consider the rule is not relevant to the engineer;
– stakeholders may be reluctant to share their rules;
– stakeholders may not be aware they use default rules.
3.5 Cascading Default Requirements
Most of the time, default requirements will be judged as relevant by a stake-
holder, who will therefore communicate spontaneously some beliefs and their
related “ground requirements”. What is important to consider is that doing
so, the stakeholder turns default requirements – and more precisely the ground
requirements of the default requirement – into new additional and finer asser-
tions. As previously explained, these new assertions may be themselves default
or ground requirements, depending on the stakeholder’s knowledge background.
There is therefore a cascading effect, in the sense that a default requirements
builds on assertions that may themselves form default or ground requirements.
The responsibility of an engineer is then to go sufficiently downward in the de-
fault tree to identify the requirements for which the stakeholder has a complete
background and does not need to use a default rule, i.e. to identify ground re-
quirements.
Considering the case of LogisTIC, it is likely that the stakeholder will share
her default requirement D according to which isOnTime(X) can be decided
based on ownV hcl(X): it is an important characteristics that she won’t omit
to share. Doing so, the stakeholder introduces a new assertion ownV hcl(X).
The question that must then be answered is whether the stakeholder has still
imperfect knowledge about that new assertion – in which case she will likely use
a new default requirement – or whether she can decide about that requirement
based on her knowledge – in which case the engineer has achieve the actual
ground requirement. Assuming the first case, the stakeholder could then adopt
a new rule according to which a TC has its own vehicles as long as it is relevant
to believe so, and if this TC has reported the vehicles in its balanced sheet.
For an engineer, this would result in a new default rule D′ to document, such
as reported in Eq. 6. Assuming the second case, the engineer can assume the
elicitation is complete enough.
D′ =

{
vhclInBalancedSheet(X):M ownV hcl(X)
ownV hcl(X)
}
: M isOnTime(X)
isOnTime(X)
 (6)
It is worthwhile to note that such cascading process – which generates de-
fault requirements – is different from classical requirements decomposition which
generate sub-requirements [20]. Default and sub-requirements differ in that:
– Defaults are de-feasible;
– Defaults are beliefs, suppositions or assumptions related to a requirement;
– Defaults are transversal, not hierarchically related to a requirement.
3.6 Documenting Default Requirements
The elicitation of default requirements can be achieved through the systematic
discussion of assertions communicated by a stakeholder. That is, an engineer
should not limit the elicitation process to a discussion of what the stakeholder
says, but should also discuss about what potential default rules have been used
that are at the origin of a communicated assertion. Such elicitation can be per-
formed using well known requirements elicitation techniques such as those sug-
gested in [21].
Elicitation is however not complete without an adequate documentation of
collected ground and default requirements. Such documentation for ground re-
quirements is straightforward, as it takes the form of a single assertion. Documen-
tation of default requirements likely raises more important conceptual questions,
mainly because default requirements are rules, not assertions. One particularly
relevant concern is the one of validity: does a default always form a valid source
of information about requirements of a stakeholder? Are there particular condi-
tions in which the default applies? What would happen if these conditions are
not respected?
In the example of LogisTIC, we identified a default requirement in Eq. 3,
which was suggesting that ownV hcl(X) must be accounted in some way when
deciding about isOnTime(X). Yet, the default rule was initially assumed for
an object X = Planes&Co. In fact, it may not have been the intention of the
stakeholder to believe Eq. 3 for X = Trains&Co. The question that must then
be answered is to know what are the conditions that must be respected in order
for the default requirement to be applicable. For instance, the default may have
been designed to apply only to TCs using flying vehicles, thereby invalidating
the default as a source of requirement about Trains&Co. We consider that,
given the nature of default rules, it is relevant to describe in the documentation
what are the conditions that must be verified in order for the default rule to be
valid, i.e. define the default domain.
Let XD refer to such default domain, for the default D. One possible way of
documenting XD is to list all the possible values of X that respect previously
discussed conditions. For LogisTIC, it would result in the list of all TCs using
flying vehicles:
XD = {Planes&Co,Zeppelins&Co,Helicopters&Co, ...} (7)
As such list can be virtually infinite, this solution seems to be infeasible. An
alternative solution consists in defining a set of conditions that were applying
at the moment the default requirement was used, and assuming that the default
requirement is a valid source of requirements about objects as long as the appli-
cation of the rule for that object respects these conditions. Doing so, an engineer
Proposition Description
isOnTime(X) Ground Requirement where X = any TC{
ownV hcl(X):M isOnTime(X)
isOnTime(X)
}
Default Requirement where X = any TC which
respects conditions stated in XD
Table 1: Documentation of Requirements for Default Rule D (Eq. 3)
would ultimately end up with a list of ground requirements to be completed with
a list of default requirements and the conditions under which they apply. An ex-
ample of formal documentation for the requirement of LogisTIC’s risk employee
about the DSS is reported in Table 1. Note that the documentation of condi-
tions is not required for ground requirements as they are objective propositions.
As such, they imply no reasoning and are expected to be interpreted by other
stakeholders in a same consistent way. This is in sharp contrast with default
requirements, which are inherently referring to subjective reasoning, and may
not be understood in the same way by other stakeholders of the system. Next
section defines what conditions there are that should to be accounted for when
documenting default requirements.
4 Context in Requirements Engineering
The validity of a default rule is ensured only for objects that respect conditions
described in the so-called default domain. This domain restricts the validity of
a default requirements to objects respecting the conditions of that requirement.
This section argues that conditions of a default requirement can be completely
characterized by the context in which the default was initially formulated. It
reviews existing definitions of context and suggests a classification of conditions
that should be accounted for when documenting default domains.
4.1 Survey of Context Definitions
Given our objective to achieve more complete elicitation and documentation, we
want to account for the largest possible set of default conditions: this implies to
account for the object on which the rule applies, but also for any information
related in some way to that object. In this paper, we consider context is an
adequate way to document conditions. Context refers to any relevant informa-
tion that is related in some way to an object. The purpose of this section is to
review definitions of context from ubiquitous / context-aware computing litera-
ture, and to identify salient dimensions of context that, we argue, also suggest
some important conditions to be documented in default domain.
For the sake of usability in RE, we want the conditions to be categorized into
dimensions. The definitions we treat in this section are therefore operational:
they provide a set of dimensions that are assumed to operationalize context
when instantiated, in contrast to lexical definitions that simply describe from
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Schillit & Theimer [22] X X X
Schilit et al. [23] X X X X ?
Brown [24] X X ? X ? X X
Abowd et al. [25] X X ? ?
Lenat [26] X X X X
Dey et al. [27] X X X X
Dey [28] X X X X ?
Zimmermann et al. [29] X X X X X
Table 2: Dimensions of Context
a theoretical point of view what context consists of. Table 2 summarizes these
definitions and presents the dimensions suggested by the latter (X refers to
dimensions that are explicitly treated in the article, ? refers to categories that
are suggested, but not explicitly mentioned).
We observe that all of the definitions concur in their observation that time
and space are dimensions of the operational definition of context, characteriz-
ing the localization of a context on a time-line / map. The same agreement is
observed for the individual dimension, which deals with people in the context.
Nearby resources is another dimension that is regularly defined as part of the
context, and which deals with animals and non-living things such as materials,
objects, or any other artefacts that can be accessed by individuals and with
which they may interact.
While the large majority of definitions deals with “things” and their localiza-
tion, it is much more difficult to find an agreement on the remaining dimensions
that form context. The physical conditions are sometimes considered as rele-
vant for the definition of context. Knowledge is a less common dimension which
includes elements about the content of knowledge, its justification and how it
is evaluated by individuals. The notion of relationship between individuals is
another recurrent element in literature on context, and deals with the relations
that exist between two or more individuals or resources. Activity is a dimension
dealing with the goals / intentions of individuals: what do they aim to do in
the context? Computer’s state and Imaginary companions are other plausible
dimensions of context.
4.2 Dimensions of Context
Based on our survey, it is possible to build a framework that supports engi-
neers during elicitation of default requirements. The framework lists dimensions
of context that can be used to describe a default domain, and is therefore to
be used as a check-list against which to study a default requirement. Among
other, the framework emphasizes what conditions have not been considered by
an engineer and which should be documented. The framework takes the form of
a taxonomy, inspired by our literature review, and adapted to fit the specifics of
requirements elicitation and default domains. It includes six important dimen-
sions: (i) Items, (ii) Rules; (iii) Localization, (iv) Activity, (v) Relationship and
(vi) Granularity. Based on these six dimensions, it is possible to account for char-
acteristics suggested by each of the reviewed context dimension. The framework
is represented in Figure 1. As a way to consolidate the framework, ensure no
important dimension has been omitted and to support the interpretation of the
framework, we mapped the dimensions with Bunge’s ontology on “the furniture
of the world” [30] (Table 3).
Fig. 1: Context Framework
Bunge’s Ontology Framework
Concept Description Dimension
Things fundamental concept Items
Properties (intrinsic,
mutual, ...), States
(functions, schema)
things have properties that
describe them. States de-
scribe properties
Activities
Granularities
Localization
Laws Restriction on or relation of
properties
Rules
Compositions Things can be composed to
form composite things
Relationships
Table 3: Mapping our Context Framework with Bunge’s Ontology
To illustrate the documentation of validity conditions for default require-
ments, we use our introductory example. As a reminder, an engineer has been
hired to elicit requirements about a DSS that will support the company in de-
ciding in an more automated way which TC to use for the transportation of its
products. During elicitation, the engineer discovered that the employee was using
a default rule, according to which the punctuality of Planes&Co can be decided
based on whether it has vehicles of its own. Based on this observation, the engi-
neer documented a default requirement D, and tries to understand under which
conditions such default requirement actually holds true. The conditions identi-
fied using the six dimensions of our framework are summarized in an improved
version of the initial documentation and illustrated in Table4.
Items Items deal with characteristics related to salient entities existing in-
side the context. It suggests mainly questions about intrinsic properties and
behaviour of the object.
Example 1. Knowing about Items, the engineer adapts her questions to discover
that the default requirement only applies to TCs which use flying vehicles, e.g.
useF lyingV hcl(X). This condition restricts the use of D to TCs using flying
vehicles because the stakeholder believes other TCs are more likely to be stuck
in traffic jam and hence face punctuality issues.
Rules Rules deals with constraints that exists in the context and which influence
in some way the actions of an item. It suggests mainly questions about laws,
cultures, habits, environmental conditions etc. influence the behaviour of the
object.
Example 2. Knowing about the Rules dimension, the engineer adapts her ques-
tions to discover that D only applies for the objects that respects the quality
charter developed by LogisTIC, e.g. qualityChart(X). This condition restricts
the use of D to quality TCs because the stakeholder believes TCs which have
no lean processes have a more important risk of being late.
Localization Localization deals with the position of an object. Localization
divides into two subcategories: one relating to the time when the object occurs,
the other dealing with place where the object occurs.
Example 3. Knowing about Localization, the engineer discovers that D only
applies for the TC that exist nowadays in Europe, e.g. locatedInEurope(X).
This condition suggests that D cannot be used to estimate punctuality of a TC
located in Asia because the stakeholder believes Asian TCs may have different
priorities.
Activity Activities deal with the set of objectives of Items. It suggests mainly
questions about the goals, the desires and the intentions of Items.
Example 4. Knowing about Activities, the engineer discovers thatD only applies
for the TCs focusing on the transportation of material, e.g. freightTransport(X).
This condition restricts the use of D to freight TCs because the stakeholder be-
lieves other TCs have different processes resulting in longer delay.
Relationship Relationships deal with the connections / links between Items
and/or Rules. They focus on the way objects relate to each other. It suggest
mainly questions about the type, the nature, the direction and the strength of
the relations.
Example 5. Knowing about Relationships, the engineer discovers that D only
applies for the TCs that have no collaboration with other TCs, e.g. ¬collaborates(X).
This condition restricts the use of D to competing TCs because the stakeholder
believes collaboration may imply unexpected re-allocation of resource that could
lead to delays.
Granularity Granularity deals with the nature, the quantity and the level of
any additional piece of information that is provided about objects.
Example 6. Knowing about Granularity, the engineer discovers that D only ap-
plies for the TCs having vehicles that on average are not older than three years,
e.g. hasNewEquipment(X). This condition restricts the use of D to TCs hav-
ing modern material, because the stakeholder believes vehicles older than three
years present a more significant risk of breakdown, and therefore of delay.
Proposition Description
isOnTime(X) Ground Requirement where X = any TC{
ownV hcl(X):M isOnTime(X)
isOnTime(X)
}
Default Requirement where X is a TC s.t.:
hasF lyingV hcl(X) ∧ qualityChart(X) ∧
locatedInEurope(X) ∧ freightTransp(X) ∧
¬collaborates(X) ∧ hasNewEquipment(X)
Table 4: Improved Documentation of Requirements for Default Rule D (Eq. 3)
5 Empirical Validation of Objects Characteristics
This section describes the empirical study that has been performed in order to
validate the context framework as a guideline for the identification of conditions
that must be respected in order for a default requirement to hold true.
5.1 Design
The validation of the framework relies on answers of decision-makers to six dis-
tinct questionnaires, each dealing with one dimension of the framework. Ques-
tionnaires test whether variations in conditions actually alter the outcome, and
therefore the validity, of a default requirement. Questionnaires consist of three
parts: a context statement, a assignment and a variability area.
Context Statement Subjects are first asked to carefully read the context
statement. The statement describes a basic situation to subjects, close to the
one we discussed in our LogisTIC running example. The statement describes a
regular benchmark problem that requires basic default reasoning to be used [31].
A benchmark is a problem in which at least two objects are introduced, that
are supposed to respect a rule. Subjects are then informed that one object does
actually not respect the rule, i.e., there is an exception to the rule. Based on this
statement, subjects are asked whether the remaining object respects that rule.
The referent context used in our experiment is:
“A survey established by a Belgian national daily newspaper, is pub-
lished on January 31, 2009. The survey proposes a comparison of some
logistic means. Among others, it compares the supply of goods by rail
or by boat. The newspaper asserts both are means of transport with
transport areas of their own. The newspaper also asserts that types of
transport that have their own infrastructures (waterways, railways, etc.)
usually offer a reliable service: little delay, no risk of damage, etc. Finally,
the newspaper emphasizes that these types of transport were originally
created for logistic, which has led to an incredibly strong competition
between them.
One year later, in 2010, the newspaper puts forward that for some
time, deliveries by train arrived regularly with a delay and more signif-
icant losses. The newspaper has not had the opportunity to repeat a
study about the boats. As a risk employee in a logistics company, you
must decide whether you can trust boat transport.”
The referent context can be summarized with the following default bench-
mark problem: logistic means with transport areas of their own provide typically
good service quality (default rule). Trains (object 1 ) and boats (object 2 ) have
transport areas of their own. Trains provide poor service quality (exception).
What quality is provided by boats? (benchmark). The answer that is expected is
that boats provide quality service, i.e. that the exception has no bearing on the
default rule. The previous problem can be solved using a default rule similar to
the one introduced in our running example, such as:
D =
{
ownInf(boats) : M isQuality(boats)
isQuality(boats)
}
(8)
Answers Using the referent context, subjects are asked to make a decision
about quality service of boats. Since the referent context is built according to
the benchmark problem structure, the choice offered to subjects is limited to
four different options. For each element inside the variability area, subjects are
asked to select one answer.
– Benchmark: the exception has no bearing on the remaining object;
– Exception: the exception also applies to the remaining object;
– Other: the exception imply another exception, with different characteristics;
– Can’t Say: the subject cannot choose one of the former propositions.
Variability Area The variability elements are introduced in the last part of
the questionnaire. Subjects are asked to answer to the question “what about the
trains?”, considering turn by turn each of the n values of the dimension we want
to test. Element 1 is the value that is presented in the referent context. Element
i(i = 1...n − 1) are substitute values that modify the referent context. Table 5
presents these elements for each dimension of the framework (the letter R refers
to the referent value).
The n parameter has been carefully considered since a trade-off exists: little
n reduces the possibility to interpret the influence of category changes; large
n makes the questionnaires too long, with a risk a bias/lack of motivation of
subjects. In our experiment, n is set to 4. It is worthy to note that a same
questionnaire always alters at most one dimension. Thereby, if an impact on the
application of the default is observed, it can only be explained by the varying
value of the dimension.
5.2 Subjects
A total of 260 subjects were questioned. All subjects were students in manage-
ment sciences, economics or computer sciences from the University of Namur.
Each subject answered four different questions, bringing the total number of
treated data to approximatively 1000 decisions. Details about respective size of
samples are presented in the results section. Each group had twenty minutes to
read the referent context definition and answer the questions. Subjects were not
compensated for participating in the study, and were asked to answer during
class time.
5.3 Procedure and Validity
Subjects can use any kind of material. Assignment mentions there is no best
answer and tells subjects that the objective of the questionnaire is to understand
how managers reason in a situation of imperfect information.
Validity concerns have been carefully study. We paid attention to eliminate
threats to (i) external validity – addressing the ability to generalize results of
the experiment to other people and other situations–, (ii) construct validity –
Dimension Variability Area
Items 1. X is a train and Y is a boat R
54 subjects 2. X is a new teleportation technology and Y is a plane
3. X is a helicopter and Y is a plane
4. X is a sub-contractor and Y is the national postal service
Rules 1. X and Y are evaluated by a national daily newspaper R
52 subjects 2. X and Y are evaluated by a national management journal
3. X and Y are evaluated by international management journal
4. X and Y are evaluated by a local people magazine
Localization 1. X and Y exist in Belgium, nowadays R
45 subjects 2. X and Y exist in China, nowadays
3. X and Y existed in 1948
4. X and Y will exist in 2025
Activity 1. X and Y were originally created for freight R
45 subjects 2. X and Y were originally created to transport persons
3. X and Y were originally created to transport any kind of load
4. X and Y were originally created for leisure
Relation 1. X and Y strongly compete with each others R
32 subjects 2. X and Y compete normally with each others
3. X and Y strongly collaborate with each others
4. X and Y keep neutral relationships
Granularity 1. X has one hour late with important damages R
33 subjects 2. X has one day delay and huge losses
3. X and Y are very similar in their way of working
4. X and Y are very different in their way of working
Table 5: Tested Dimensions Levels by Dimension
ensuring that the experiment measures what must actually be measured – (iii)
internal validity – dealing with the extent to which the independent variables
causally link to the dependent variables – and finally (iv) conclusion validity
– aiming to ensure that there is a significant relationship between the treatment
and the outcome of the survey [32]. We consider the use of students is not a
threat to validity, as our main concern is to test human reasoning.
6 Results
The validation of our framework passes by the observation that, given a change
in one of the dimensions of the framework, i.e. the variability area, there is
a change in the outcome of the decision process. As we selected benchmark
exercises that require basic default reasoning [31], and suggested that default
reasoning is one adequate way to perceive how decision-making happens during
elicitation of requirement, the following validation can be seen as the verification
that our dimensions are relevant to consider during elicitation of requirements.
In other words, observing significant differences in proportion of answers, for
each dimension, results in the validation of dimensions for characterizing va-
lidity conditions of default rules used by stakeholders during elicitation. Table
6 presents the proportions of answer for each tested levels of the framework’s
dimensions, and for each possible answer. Note that B stands for benchmark,
E for exception, O for other and A for abstention. These proportions are also
illustrated in Figure 2.
Firstly, proportions of answers reported in Table 6 show that subjects often
achieve the highest proportion of benchmark, i.e. the correct answer, for the
referent context. This was expected, as the referent level is the first benchmark
problem on which subjects reason. From a general point of view, we observe that
performance of subjects decreases when the characteristics of the objects used
in the initial default rule change. As an illustration, consider the granularity
dimension: we observe that subjects achieve nearly 80% of benchmark for the
referent question in which it is explained that the object is on average one hour
late with important damages. When subjects are asked to reason about the same
problem with same object but considering that it is similar to another object of
the context, the performance drops to 10%, and subjects prefer the exception
answer.
B E O A B E O A
Item - 1 .537 .074 .167 .222 Rule - 1 .327 .308 .135 .231
Item - 2 .370 .204 .111 .315 Rule - 2 .385 .250 .115 .250
Item - 3 .278 .148 .296 .278 Rule - 3 .269 .288 .019 .423
Item - 4 .352 .130 .278 .241 Rule - 4 .173 .500 .154 .173
Loc. - 1 .435 .109 .152 .304 Act. - 1 .356 .356 .111 .178
Loc. - 2 .326 .239 .087 .348 Act. - 2 .400 .333 .156 .111
Loc. - 3 .239 .261 .239 .261 Act. - 3 .400 .333 .156 .111
Loc. - 4 .065 .348 .130 .457 Act. - 4 .133 .422 .067 .378
Rel. - 1 .500 .250 .094 .156 Granul. - 1 .788 .091 .061 .091
Rel. - 2 .375 .375 .187 .094 Granul. - 2 .667 .061 .121 .152
Rel. - 3 .125 .313 .406 .156 Granul. - 3 .091 .091 .758 .061
Rel. - 4 .312 .500 .031 .156 Granul. - 4 .424 .121 .030 .424
Table 6: Proportion of Answers to our Questionnaires
Secondly, it is interesting to note that in the case of activities and rules (the
two dimensions for which the best performance is not achieved with the referent
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Fig. 2: Results of the Experiment by Categories
Answer Answer * Level
Dim. DF(n,d)  F-Stat P-Val DF(n,d)  F-Stat P-Val
Item (3,159) 1.00 8.510 0.000∗ (9,477) 0.87 2.048 0.041∗
Rule (3,153) 0.82 5.097 0.004∗ (9,459) 0.82 3.493 0.001∗
Loc. (3,135) 0.89 5.547 0.002∗ (9,405) 0.94 2.792 0.004∗
Act. (3,132) 0.67 6.319 0.003∗ (9,396) 0.87 2.756 0.006∗
Rel. (3,93) 0.69 3.884 0.024∗ (9,279) 0.92 3.793 0.000∗
Gran. (3,96) 0.82 17.465 0.000∗ (9,79) 0.76 17.381 0.000∗
Significance codes: ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Table 7: Significance Test on Proportions of Answers
level), the highest proportion of benchmark answers is achieved for levels that
are the most likely to happen for subjects. As an example, note that subjects
reach the highest performance for level 3 of the activity dimension (trains were
created for both people and freight transport), because they consider it more
plausible than level 1 (trains were created only for freight). This observation
was confirmed during a feedback session organized after the experiment.
Thirdly, we observe that subjects reach highest rate of abstention when the
object that is described has characteristics that are impossible or difficult to
reason about. This is for instance the case with level 2 of the Items dimension,
in which the object is described as a teleportation means.
Significance tests presented in Table 7 are performed using a repeated mea-
sure ANOVA on the previous proportions of answers, for each dimension and
for each level. Working on the proportions implies that the answers selected
by subject are considered as another potentially influencing factor [33]. In this
experiment, we are therefore concerned with the interaction between answers
and the levels of dimensions. Tests were performed with R-Project, using the
ezANOVA package. Table 7 summarizes the results for the answer factor, and
for the interaction between answers and levels of the dimensions. The test is suc-
cessful when we can reject the null hypothesis of the repeated measure ANOVA
– which states that µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ4 – and accept the alternative hypoth-
esis –according to which at least one mean is different to another mean. We
observe a statistically significant effect of each dimensions level on the outcome
of decision-making that requires default reasoning.
Normality assumption was tested and verified for the set of data that we
collected. Repeated measures ANOVA are however particularly susceptible to
the violation of the sphericity assumption. This was the case for our data set.
P-Values reported in Table 7 are therefore the result of a Huynh-Feldt correction
process [34]. The correction amounts to multiplying freedom degrees by a pa-
rameter , obtained via the sphercity test. This manipulation does not alter the
value of the F-statistic, but results in an increase of the p-value, so that the risk
of Type I error is reduced. Despite this correction, we observe a significant in-
fluence of each dimension on the outcome of a decision process requiring default
reasoning.
For each of the six questionnaires, we observe a significant influence of the
“answer” factor. This is interpreted as the fact that answers B, E, O and A
have been selected by subjects in significantly different proportions. Although
interesting, this first observation does not validate our framework. Looking in
the “answers*levels” columns, we observe that there is a significant influence.
This can be interpreted as the fact that the proportion of an answer for B,
E, O and A depends on the level of the dimension that is tested. This second
observation validates our framework as a list of dimensions for characterizing
validity conditions of default requirements.
7 Discussion and Guidelines
The objective of our experiment was to determine whether subjects change the
way they use a default rule when the conditions initially defined for that default
rule evolves according to one of the dimensions of our framework. The objective
of the experiment was not to study the direction of these variations: we do not
aim to explain why subjects choose the “Benchmark” answer for level 1 of a
dimension and prefer the “Exception” answer for the second level. Such work,
though interesting, would require many empirical efforts over the long term.
We consider the objective of our experiment is achieved, because it enables
to demonstrate the relevance of our framework as an adequate tool to consider
context during the elicitation of requirements. This conclusion is achieved based
on two major observations. Firstly, we observe that subjects systematically reach
the maximum “Benchmark” proportion for the context that they consider to be
the most representative of the real world. We interpret this as rationality, i.e.,
subjects are less likely to select a wrong answer for the benchmark problem when
the conditions are close to their own perception of the real world. Secondly,
we observe that subjects systematically decrease their performance when the
context is changing according to one context dimension. We do not explain why
they modify their choice, we simply observe that they significantly do so. We do
not test the interactions between dimensions, we test the influence of standalone
varying dimensions.
While the development of a methodology for the correct and systematic iden-
tification of default domain is beyond the scope of this paper, results of the ex-
periment enable to suggest some relevant guideline to support engineers in such
task:
– As decision-makers are more consistent when using default rules in situations
that are conform to their perception of the world, we suggest that the elic-
itation of default requirements should take place in circumstances that are
perceived as regular for the stakeholder. This implies discussing about well
known objects, using well known elicitation techniques, avoiding references
to unknown concepts or contexts;
– Documentation should be considered as complete if and only if it describes
in some way the conditions that must be verified for a default requirements,
in terms of items that are targeted by the default requirement, but also
localization, rules, relationships, activities and granularities of these items;
– We observe subjects are more sensible to changes in some dimensions of
the framework. Engineers should for example pay particular attention to
documenting granularity, as it may lead to very important changes in the
way default requirements is applied;
– As the use of default rules is subjective, we suggest that engineers perform
some cross-validation of identified default requirements with other stakehold-
ers of the projects. This enables to reduce the margin for interpretation and
confirm the correct documentation of the default domain.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study decision making during elicitation of requirements, and
how to achieve better completeness of elicitation. Based on default logic, we
propose a distinction between ground requirements that are explicitly commu-
nicated and default requirements that are implicitly assumed but not always
correctly communicated to - or identified by - engineers. We argue the docu-
mentation of default requirements should account for the situation in which the
default was designed, and claim such situation can be depicted using dimensions
of context. We review definitions of context proposed in literature on context-
aware and ubiquitous computing, and propose a context framework that supports
engineers in the documentation of the default domain. We provide an empirical
validation of the framework. We observe that each of the six categories of our
framework significantly influences the way individuals make default based deci-
sions. The framework therefore constitutes an adequate tool to support engineers
in the identification and documentation of the default domain. We conclude the
paper with a discussion about the results of the experiment, and some guidelines
that can be suggested based on these results.
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